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Article 5

A Prolegomenon to Any Future
Restatement of Privacy*
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.†
INTRODUCTION: THE ALI AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
The American Law Institute (ALI) has played an
important, indeed crucial, role in the advancement of privacy
rights. Most notably, the ALI advocated for the repeal of antisodomy laws1 almost a full half century before the Supreme
Court’s landmark ruling in Lawrence v. Texas2 held such
enactments to be unconstitutional.3 As Professor Bill Eskridge,
Jr. notes, the ALI “had in 1955 voted to exclude consensual
sodomy from the Model Penal Code (which the Institute
ultimately adopted in 1962).”4 The ALI’s reasoning for this
decision “was that consensual sodomy laws inevitably
engendered police corruption and arbitrary enforcement and
© 2014 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. All Rights Reserved.
John S. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law,
University of Alabama School of Law. With thanks to Professor Anita Bernstein, for
both organizing and inviting me to participate in the Restatement of . . . symposium,
and to the American Law Institute and Brooklyn Law School for supporting the event.
Thanks also to the other presenters and attendees, who generously offered very helpful
and constructive comments on this Article; my contribution reflects the benefit of their
ideas and suggestions. I would like to acknowledge the support of the University of
Alabama Law School Foundation, which provided generous research support for my
work on this project (in the form of a summer research grant). I also wish to thank the
Lewis & Clark Law School for hosting me as a visiting scholar in residence during the
summer of 2013, while I was working on this project. As always, any and all errors and
omissions are my responsibility alone.
1 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law
Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100
GEO. L.J.1881, 1926 (2012) (observing that “the drafters of the Model Penal Code were not
inclined to criminalize conduct that pleased its perpetrators and did not harm other persons,
and they did not care that such conduct violated some natural law ideal” and noting that
“the final version of the Code, ratified by the ALI in 1962, decriminalized consensual
fornication, adultery, sodomy, and cohabitation”).
2 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3 See id.at 562, 577-79.
4 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Cases—Reversing the Burden of
Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1798 (2009).
*
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that invading people’s private consensual sexual activities did
not advance the public interest.”5
So too, the ALI promoted the liberalization of abortion
laws over a decade before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
v. Wade.6 As one commentator observed, “Although there has
been continued agitation for abortion law reform or repeal in
this country since at least the 1920s, the modern abortionrights movement generally traces its origins to 1959, when the
American Law Institute (ALI) published its proposed revisions
to existing state abortion laws.”7
In light of these tremendously important contributions
to the development and protection of privacy rights in the United
States, it would be fair to say that although the ALI has never
undertaken to create a formal Restatement of the Law of Privacy,
the organization has been at the forefront of advancing and
securing privacy for many years. Both of these earlier law reform
proposals were, at least in the context of their times, strikingly
bold. Indeed, it has always been a hallmark of the ALI to ask and
answer hard questions—and to refuse to simply credit the
argument that “this is how things are” as a persuasive rationale
for maintaining particular legal rules and practices.8
In this article, I will sketch some of the problems and
issues that would confront an effort to create a Restatement of the
Law of Privacy. In some important respects, the ALI’s reform
efforts aimed at securing the repeal of state criminal laws
regulating private sexual conduct and abortion were substantially
easier to address—notwithstanding the controversial nature of
the underlying subject matter—than the many and varied legal
5 Id.; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 118-24 (2008) (describing and discussing the ALI’s
important role in promoting the repeal of anti-sodomy laws).
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The ALI’s draft of the MODEL PENAL CODE, issued in 1959,
called for substantial liberalization of abortion regulations, to permit legal abortions (1) if
necessary to protect the life or health of the mother, (2) if a pregnancy was the result of
either rape or incest, or (3) if the gestating fetus was likely to suffer from significant birth
defects. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
7 Brian W. Clowes, The Role of Maternal Deaths in the Abortion Debate, 13
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 328 (1993).
8 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897). Justice Holmes famously argued that:

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Id.; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing and quoting to Holmes on this point).
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and policy questions surrounding the concept of privacy more
generally. One has only to look at contemporary newspaper
headlines to see that the issue of privacy, in 2014, presents
myriad complexities.9 Whether you are concerned about Google
Earth filming your street and home or the National Security
Agency snooping on whom you call on your cell phone and what
websites you visit, privacy issues have cross-cutting and
polycentric attributes that render them difficult to collect,
synthesize, and restate.
The ALI presently has a principles project underway on
privacy and data protection, but even this project faces serious
difficulties because of the transnational nature of data flows.
Simply put, a privacy regime limited to the United States will
not be sufficient to prevent or deter the collection and
dissemination of personal data in the wider world.
To facilitate the successful completion of a Restatement of
Privacy, the ALI must effectively address two major problems.
First, the concept of privacy would need to be defined with
greater precision. At present, privacy lacks clear contours and
meaning.10 As Professor James Q. Whitman has observed,
“[H]onest advocates of privacy protections are forced to admit
that the concept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to
define.”11 We would have to agree on the discrete interests that
fall under the rubric of privacy before we could seek to restate
the field. Second, and to a degree not present in most other
areas of the law, successfully securing privacy interests would
require transnational cooperation.12 Restating privacy law, at
least in the context of data protection and the privacy torts,
cannot be solely a domestic affair.
I do not suggest that it would be impossible to create a
Restatement of privacy; I do believe that such a project would
9 See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Postal Service Is Watching, Too: Outside of All Mail Is
Recorded, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A1, A16 (describing high-tech spying operations
conducted by the U.S. Postal Service, which include photographing and storing “the exterior
of every piece of mail that is processed in the United States—about 160 billion pieces last
year”). There is no judicial review or oversight of the use of the data gathered by the USPS.
See id. Of course, government spying efforts are only one piece of the puzzle; the increased
use of networked computers has created vast opportunities for private companies to collect,
store, and sell personal data too. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries,
Google’s iPhone Tracking, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204880404577225380456599176.html (describing and discussing
Google’s practice of “bypassing the privacy settings of millions of people using Apple
Inc.’s Web browser on their iPhones and computers”).
10 See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
11 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004).
12 See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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be very difficult. In the balance of this article, I will explore
and explicate these themes.
I.

TOWARD A RESTATEMENT OF PRIVACY LAW: THE
PROBLEM OF DEFINING “PRIVACY”

The current absence of a Restatement of the Law of
Privacy should not be entirely surprising. Privacy is a protean
concept that seems to mean everything—and nothing—at the
same time. In a previous work, I have explored in some detail
the ambiguity of privacy—both in U.S. law and transnationally.13
Although I will not repeat my argument in full, some of the main
points have immediate relevance here.
A comprehensive and effective Restatement of privacy
would, as an initial matter, have to establish a persuasive
working definition of precisely what interests fall within its
rubric. Given the difficulty of this definitional project, it might
well be easier, and perhaps even more effective, to disaggregate
privacy interests and only address discrete privacy issues incident
to other Restatements. Under this approach, privacy is not
restated, nor in need of restatement as such, because it does not
really constitute a discrete and self-contained area of law, like
torts, property, or contract. For example, Prosser’s privacy torts
could be left in the Restatement of Torts;14 privacy issues in the
workplace could be addressed in the Restatement of Employment
Law; search and seizure law incident to police law, and the rules
governing reproductive rights would be located elsewhere—
wholly separate and distinct from Restatement rules governing
data protection and privacy in the workplace. Continuing that
idea, a Restatement of consumer law could include data
protection protocols for web-based transactions, but would not
address the privacy torts. And so forth. In other words, rather
than attempt to create an independent law of privacy, privacy
could simply be disaggregated and assimilated into other
substantive areas of the law. Thus, this approach would avoid the
difficulty of articulating and applying a more concrete and
functional definition of privacy.
Although this potential solution to the problem of privacy
initially might seem quite promising, I am not convinced that it
presents a viable solution. We speak of privacy and privacy
13 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881
(2013). I am presently at work on a book-length treatment of the concept of privacy, from a
comparative law perspective, forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2015 or 2016.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A–E (1977).

2014]

RESTATEMENT OF PRIVACY

509

interests in our regular everyday lives and the concept plays a
central role in contemporary human rights jurisprudence in the
United States.15 Privacy is a concept with tremendous social,
political, moral, and even economic salience. To pretend that
privacy qua privacy does not exist would probably not
constitute a workable solution in the long run. If we cannot
slay the privacy hydra, then we must learn to live with the
privacy hydra.
Toward this end, we should start by identifying and
explicating those interests that, properly understood, come within
the rubric of “privacy.” I will not attempt a comprehensive listing
of privacy interests here. But in the United States, privacy
encompasses readily identifiable interests, such as freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, data protection, and
Prosser’s famous basket of torts rights,16 including intrusion upon
seclusion, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and
appropriation of personality.17 In the United States, we also tend
to assimilate fundamental liberty interests associated with the
most important life choices into the concept of privacy.18
The concept of privacy is no less broad, or dense, than
the concept of “property,” another legal construct used to define
and protect myriad related, but distinct, legal interests.19 An
important difference exists, however, between privacy on the
one hand, and property on the other. In both the United States
and the wider world, we seem to have worked out a reasonably
choate list of things that constitute “property” and we have
general transnational agreement about what does—and does
not—constitute a legitimate property interest. Because a
reasonably broad global consensus exists regarding the content
See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). For a thoughtful
discussion of Prosser’s contribution to privacy as tort, see generally Neil M. Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977); see also Krotoszynski,
supra note 13, at 882-88.
18 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 882, 906-07.
19 Interestingly, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY has been divided
into different sections, so although property presents a more unified field of law than
privacy, the drafting committee has decided that dividing the subject would bring
greater coherence to the restatement effort. Thus, the restatement of property law
spans four separate and distinct subfields: the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW) (1977), the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
(MORTGAGES) (1997); the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (2000);
and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS)
(2013). For an instructive discussion of how nomenclature and descriptive divisions
matter in property law, see generally Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
15
16
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and scope of property rights, securing these interests effectively
should be considerably easier than securing privacy interests.20
Simply put, privacy is a concept that is more locally situated
than property; accordingly, domestic understandings of privacy
vary more widely than do domestic understandings of property.
Local culture strongly informs and shapes the articulation and
protection of privacy interests with particular legal systems.
Other definitional interests also would have to be
addressed and resolved in framing the scope of a Restatement of
privacy. For starters, privacy straddles, indeed criss-crosses, the
public/private law dichotomy.21 By this, I mean that privacy rights
involve expectations and demands running against both the state
and non-state actors.22 We certainly expect the government to
respect our privacy, but we should be equally concerned about our
privacy vis-à-vis each other and private corporations.23
Google and Microsoft present as much of a threat to
privacy as non-disclosure24 as the local city government (and

20 The nature of property also makes effective regulation easier—although I
should not overstate this point. Intellectual property, which need not be tangible,
presents some of the same difficulties as privacy. Tangible property, by way of contrast,
exists within only one jurisdiction. Accordingly, the ability to make and enforce
property regulations can be accomplished with reasonable efficacy.
21 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (2003) (noting that many government functions are
being delegated to nominally private entities and that “[p]rivatization is now virtually
a national obsession”).
22 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 864, 884-86 (1986) (discussing the state action doctrine and its potential
relevance to establishing obligations on government to regulate private action); Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995) (discussing
and critiquing the state action doctrine’s relevance to limiting the scope and effect of
constitutional rights).
23 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405, 1412-16 (1986) (arguing that, in the context of free speech, the power of
private companies to censor or restrict speech can be every bit as harmful to the
marketplace of ideas—perhaps even more harmful—than government efforts at
censorship). Professor Fiss suggests that the use of government regulatory power could
actually enhance, rather than degrade, the marketplace of ideas. He suggests that
“[j]ust as it is no longer possible to assume that the private sector is all freedom, we can
no longer assume that the state is all censorship.” Id. at 1415. The same basic
argument holds true with respect to securing privacy interests against large,
monopolistic corporations as well. Government regulation of entities like Google,
Microsoft, and Facebook might well enhance personal freedom rather than inhibit it—
especially with respect to vesting effective control over personal information and data
in those who use the platforms that these companies provide.
24 One could also characterize this interest as “informational privacy,” that is, the
ability to control the gathering and dissemination of personal information, whether by the
government or other persons. See R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, para. 42 (Can.) (“Our concern is
thus with informational privacy: ‘[T]he claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
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probably more). Monopolistic or oligopolistic corporations that
collect, store, and sell personal data on a massive scale likely
present a serious, but largely unaddressed, threat to privacy as
non-disclosure in the United States. At the same time,
however, privacy rights certainly involve expectations running
against the state as well. Thus, unlike tort, contract, or foreign
relations law, a comprehensive and universal Restatement of
privacy law would need to expressly address privacy standards
for both government and non-government actors.
An additional difficulty would involve how best to create
and define privacy rights. Are these primarily individual rights
or are they collective rights? Or perhaps both? Do we think
privacy protections are primarily designed to protect an
individual’s interest in non-disclosure and autonomy? Or should
privacy rights, properly conceived, be thought of in terms of
groups that might have collective expectations of privacy (such as
students, office workers, or journalists)?25 To provide another
concrete example, one could think about privacy in the workplace
as being about the status of workers as a group or,
alternatively, about the rights of individuals who happen to be
in a workplace. As I have previously noted, “in the United
States more often than not we tend to frame human rights in
terms of the individual rather than the group.”26
The conceptualization of privacy rights as being individual
or collective could have important implications for their scope. For
instance, in the area of free speech jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has tended to create context-specific rules for speech—thus,
the free speech rights of public school students27 and public
employees28 are not the same as those of an angry proselytizer
speaking from a soap box located on a public sidewalk or in a
park.29 Government employees as a class, for example, possess
significantly degraded free speech rights within the workplace.30
I suppose that theorizing privacy rights in terms of groups
rather than individuals need not necessarily imply reduced rights
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others’” (quoting R v. Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, para. 23 (Can.))).
25 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 910-13.
26 Id. at 911.
27 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
29 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
30 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011); Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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for those in groups (such as government workers in the free
speech context), but this could well be how matters would come to
rest. More absolute rights, drawn around the individual, without
regard to the particular context at issue, might better secure
privacy interests against government abridgment. On the other
hand, government would likely resist broader privacy protections
in the context of schools, government workplaces, and the like
precisely because it would claim a managerial need for snooping.31
Other conceptual difficulties would have to be addressed.
For example, in the jurisprudence of many European domestic
constitutional courts, and also the European Court of Human
Rights, it is possible to be “private in public.”32 In other words, the
fact that one happens to be in a public place does not
automatically defeat a claim of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.33 In the United States, our jurisprudence generally
rejects out of hand the notion that one can be private in
public.34 We could certainly maintain this position with respect
to a purely domestic Restatement of privacy, but such an
approach would complicate the creation of a more global
consensus about the proper meaning and scope of privacy
rights. For privacy protections to effectively protect our
personal data, some sort of transnational system of regulation
will probably be essential.
A more generalized problem is the interplay of privacy
with commitments to expressive freedom—particularly the
freedom of speech and of the press. In the United States, we
generally privilege expressive freedom over safeguarding privacy,
human dignity, and personal honor. The Supreme Court’s
relatively recent decisions in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.35 and
31 On the government as a manager and how that role could legitimately
inform the potential scope of constitutional rights within the workplace, see Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 153, 164-67 (1996).
32 See N.A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 606 (2006)
(discussing the commonly held position in Europe that it is possible for a public official
or public figure to possess a reasonable—and legally protected—expectation of privacy
while in an otherwise public place or area).
33 See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
34 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1217-20 (2011).
35 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668-72 (2011). For a thoughtful and highly persuasive
discussion of the possible implications that a broad interpretation of the holding in Sorrell
could have on government efforts (whether legislative or judicial) to protect privacy, see
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36
VT. L. REV. 855 (2012). Professor Bhagwat argues that the broader implications of Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Sorrell could “have dramatic, and extremely troubling,
implications for a broad range of existing and proposed rules that seek to control disclosure
of personal information in order to protect privacy.” Id. at 856.
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Snyder v. Phelps36 reflect this ordering of values. In both cases,
expressive freedom trumped state law efforts to protect privacy.37
II.

THE SALIENCE OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES: WHY
THE LAW OF PRIVACY MIGHT BE WORTH RESTATING

Privacy’s salience, at least in the United States, arises in no
small measure because of the weight and importance of the
autonomy interests that the Supreme Court of the United States
has brought under the privacy aegis. Simply put, we look to privacy
to protect autonomy interests central to human self-definition and
dignity, such as reproductive rights and the ability to enjoy some
measure of sexual autonomy—at least between consenting adults,
in private, and not for direct forms of remuneration.
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey38
provides an important and highly relevant illustration of the
centrality of constitutional privacy as autonomy39 in U.S.
human rights law:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education . . . . Our precedents “have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.40

In Casey, the concept of constitutional privacy relates
directly to the freedom to make central decisions about our
personal lives free and clear of state compulsion. Individuals have

131 S. Ct. at 1217-20.
See id. at 1218-20 (rejecting privacy justification for imposing liability for
speech on a matter of public concern); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668, 2672 (rejecting a
privacy-based justification for a legal prohibition on the sale of physicians’ prescription
data to pharmaceutical companies for use in marketing programs aimed at doctors).
38 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion).
39 By “privacy as autonomy,” I mean the ability to exercise agency or control
over important decisions central to one’s self-definition and happiness. See, e.g., R. v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 166 (Can.) (Wilson, J., concurring) (“Liberty, as was
noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a broad range of meaning. In my view, this right,
properly construed, grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of
fundamental personal importance.”).
40 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
36
37
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a constitutional right to “define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of human life.”
Of course, the authors of the joint opinion cannot mean
literally what they seem to be saying. Moreover, subsequent
cases, such as Washington v. Glucksberg,41 and Gonzalez v.
Raich,42 demonstrate that concrete limits and exceptions cabin
the scope of this constitutionally protected realm of individual
liberty. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter—the authors of the Casey joint opinion—
erred in finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest that
encompasses reproductive choice. On the other hand, Casey’s
remarkably broad language does little to help clarify the actual
metes and bounds of this constitutionally protected zone of
personal autonomy.
At least arguably, the Casey joint opinion’s broad but
imprecise language about the centrality of human freedom and
dignity both establishes the need for a Restatement of privacy
and also the profound difficulty of undertaking the task. The
problem with constitutional privacy, running all the way back
to Lochner-era cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters43 and Meyer
v. Nebraska,44 is a lack of adequate specificity regarding how
the conflicting values at issue—the right of the individual to be
self-regulating in matters of central importance to happiness
and identity on the one hand, and the right of the community,
acting through democratically constituted institutions of
government, to establish rules that permit peaceful coexistence
over time, on the other—should be reconciled.
Casey provides a salient example of the Supreme Court
embracing privacy as a means of describing and delimiting
fundamental liberty interests. Lawrence v. Texas45 provides
another. Writing for the majority in Lawrence, Justice
Kennedy argues:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government. “It is a

41
42
43
44
45

521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.”46

This language reflects the same general framing device
used in the Casey joint opinion—that the government may not
legitimately “control the destiny” of human beings, at least insofar
as private, consensual sexual conduct between consenting adults
is at issue. But, as with Casey, the exact scope of this “realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter” goes
largely undefined.
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does seem to place
significant weight on the notion of privacy within one’s home or
dwelling. He explains that:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition
the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The
instant case involves liberty of the person in both its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions.47

In that portion of the opinion, Justice Kennedy plainly invokes a
tradition, reflected in the common law, that conveys autonomy
on individuals when in their own home.48 But, even here, Justice
Kennedy almost immediately discards this limitation in favor of
endorsing broader, more open-ended language: “Freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds,”49 and constitutionally protected
liberty “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”50
The problem, obviously enough, is that these unrelated
interests are quite disparate and canvass a great deal of wholly
unrelated territory. Were the ALI to undertake an effort to
restate the law of privacy, the discrete interests to be protected
would need to be identified and described in much finer detail.
The language in Casey and Lawrence reads quite nicely as
poetry, but fails to provide adequate concrete guidance regarding
46

Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

847 (1992)).
Id. at 562.
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969); see also Whitman,
supra note 11, at 1211-19 (discussing the deep-seated tradition in U.S. law of relating
legally protected privacy interests to “the sanctity of the home”).
49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
50 Id.
47
48
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the inevitable balancing that privacy claims require. More
specifically, neither decision clearly addresses how lower federal
and state courts should go about balancing an individual’s privacy
claim against the government’s response that a particular
regulation advances a sufficiently important interest in a
reasonably tailored way to survive constitutional review.51
Like Justice Hugo L. Black, we can all like our privacy as
much as the next person, even if one person’s concept of privacy
varies considerably from another person’s understanding of the
concept.52 And, to borrow Justice Stewart’s infelicitous turn of
phrase, perhaps we are to know privacy when we see it.53 In any
event, any potentially successful attempt to restate privacy law
comprehensively would require identifying with far greater
precision precisely what rights and interests fall within the
concept of privacy—and which do not. At the same time,
however, the centrality and the persistence of privacy as an
important legal construct suggest that an effort to better
articulate precisely what privacy means could help bring
needed clarity to an important area of the law.
III.

THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL APPROACH: AN EFFECTIVE
RESTATEMENT OF PRIVACY WOULD REQUIRE
TRANSNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON HOW BEST TO SECURE
BOTH PRIVACY INTERESTS AND CONFLICTING VALUES
SUCH AS FREE SPEECH AND PRESS RIGHTS

At least in some important respects, a workable system
of privacy protection will have to be transnational in scope if it
is to secure privacy interests reliably and effectively against
abridgment (whether by the state or non-government actors).
For example, an effective data protection regime cannot rely
solely on a single sovereign, unless the Internet can somehow
be cabined within a single national jurisdiction. To be sure,

51 See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS 75-78, 340-78 (Doron Kalir, trans., 2012) (discussing the judge’s
inevitable task of balancing when constitutional rights come into conflict with
legitimate social policies).
52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I like
my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”).
53 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description [of obscenity]; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.”).
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China’s successful efforts at censorship on a mass scale54
suggest that it is possible to nationalize and police the content
available to one’s citizens on the web. But in most democratic
nations committed to the rule of law, official government
censorship of this scope would be politically unthinkable (or so
I would have thought, prior to the lack of much of a domestic
public response to Edward Snowden’s highly troubling
revelations about the NSA’s massive domestic spying
programs).55 So too, if privacy law should afford some measure
of protection against disclosure of private facts, it would be
helpful to publishers of all stripes, and in all jurisdictions, to
have a better sense of where to draw the line between matters
of public concern and a subject’s legally protected private life.
Most legal and policy questions do not require
transnational agreement for a system of regulation to be
effective. For example, a nation can make a more or less free
choice regarding when to permit the lawful sale of alcohol or
tobacco based on age. If a jurisdiction establishes a minimum
age of 21 for the lawful purchase, possession, and use of these
products, this legal rule will have no necessary effect on a
neighboring polity’s decision to adopt 18 years of age instead.
The decision of where to set the age of majority for these
products is largely, if not entirely, local in effect and capable of
effective enforcement on a local basis.

54 See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, U.S. Prism, Meet China’s Golden Shield, INT’L
HERALD TRIB. (June 28, 2013, 3:10 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
06/28/u-s-prism-meet-chinas-golden-shield/?_r=0 (noting that “Golden Shield is over a
decade old, an overarching monitoring network spun by the state that encompasses the
colloquially-named Great Firewall of Internet censorship”); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., The Irrelevant Wasteland: An Exploration of Why Red Lion Doesn’t
Matter (Much) in 2008, the Crucial Importance of the Information Revolution, and the
Continuing Relevance of the Public Interest Standard in Regulating Access to Spectrum,
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 911, 919 n.27, 936-37 (2008) (discussing the censorship of the
Internet in China and several other nations, including North Korea and Cuba).
55 See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Accused of
Eavesdropping on German President, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2013, at A10 (noting that
although Edward Snowden’s revelations had largely “settled in the United States” only
a few months after their release, his revelations remained highly charged and
politically relevant in Western Europe). Even a relatively modest proposal to improve
the oversight powers of the FISA court produced predictable political responses and
seems unlikely to be enacted. See Siobhan Gorman, Carol E. Lee, & Janet Hook,
Obama Vows Spying Overhaul: NSA Leaker Snowden’s Revelations Hasten Call to
Revamp Surveillance Court and Patriot Act, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2013, 5:40PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB40001424127887324522504579002653564348842
(reporting on reforms proposed by the Obama Administration to NSA oversight by the
FISA court and noting that the president’s proposed reforms “drew sharp responses
from Republican lawmakers who suggested the president was retreating under
political pressure”).
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The same would be true with respect to setting a
minimum age for voting in national elections—most nations
use 18 as the age of voting majority, but this not universally
true.56 In Austria, persons at least 16 years of age are entitled to
vote in national, state, and local elections (but not in elections for
the European Parliament, which requires that all electors be at
least 18 years of age).57 As with the minimum age of majority for
alcohol and tobacco products, one nation’s policy choice on this
question will not significantly affect or impede another’s.
However, given the interconnected and global nature of
information technology systems, a single nation will be unable
to regulate data flows beyond its own borders. Thus, for a
system of privacy protection of personal data to be effective,
some level of global consensus will be necessary. Data located
in the cloud is arguably everywhere and nowhere at the same
time. Certainly, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to
determine the physical location of the data. So too, if a web
page can be viewed anywhere in the world at any time,
attempting to ascertain its “real” physical location would
constitute an exercise in futility.
Information captured and stored in one jurisdiction will
not be subject to regulations made and enforced by a
government somewhere else—even if the data relates to citizens
of that jurisdiction. Privacy, at least with respect to control over
the disclosure or non-disclosure of personal data, raises difficult
questions about the potential efficacy of domestic regulatory
efforts. In this field, going it alone will likely not produce
acceptable results. The question of whether an effective national
regulatory regime for data storage and transfer could be
successfully enforced represents the second wave (with the first
being the definitional problems associated with privacy as a
legal construct).58 The transnational aspects of the problem of
privacy regulation begin, but do not end, with the problem of
data existing simultaneously within multiple jurisdictions.
Conflicts between constitutionally protected rights of free
expression and privacy are another area that would seem to
56 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and
the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447 (2012) (arguing that the U.S.
should follow the lead of several other democratic polities and lower the minimum
voting age below 18).
57 Joshua Gans, Why It’s Time To Give Children The Right To Vote, FORBES
(Apr. 20, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuagans/2012/04/20/its-timeto-give-children-the-vote/.
58 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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require some form of transnational agreement and cooperation.59
An exclusively local effort at restating, and renormalizing,
privacy law would be insufficient because a blog post in
Indianapolis can have serious reputational effects in Brisbane,
Australia, or Frankfurt, Germany. Because a great deal of speech
is no longer truly local, an exclusively U.S.-based effort to
conceptualize privacy will not succeed in providing clear guidance
to either publishers or those who trade in personal data.
The different nomenclature used to afford protection to
privacy interests also must be taken into consideration.60 In other
democratic polities, like Germany, the nomenclature of privacy is
different than in the United States.61 As Professor Whitman
argues, “[c]ontinental privacy protections are, at their core, a form
of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity.”62
In fact, the word “privacy” simply does not appear in the
German Basic Law (Germany’s constitution).63 Instead, the Basic
Law conveys protection for legal interests such as “dignity,” “free
development of the personality,” and “personal honor”;64 these
concepts, individually and in conjunction, create and protect a
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy.65 However, privacy
lacks much constitutional salience as a legal construct in
Germany. If one wishes to consider the concept of privacy in
Germany, one must investigate judicial decisions implicating
dignity, personal development, and honor.66 The law’s goals and
59 See Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective:
Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941 (2011); Timothy Zick,
Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging Complexities of Transborder
Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 174 (2012).
60 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1153-59.
61 See id. at 1160-64.
62 Id. at 1161.
63 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 906.
64 GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIKDEUTCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) (“Human dignity shall be
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”); id. art.
2(1) (“Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or
the moral law.”); id. art. 5(2) (limiting the scope of protected expressive freedoms under
the Basic Law when such limits arise by operation of “the provisions of general laws, in
provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor”)
(emphasis added).
65 Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 903-06; see Whitman, supra note 11, at
1180-89 (discussing and describing the development and sources of “privacy” protection
in Germany, which generally relate to laws aimed at protecting personal honor,
reputation, and dignity).
66 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1153-60 (discussing legal, cultural, and
political differences in framing and protecting autonomy interests in the United States
and Europe). As Professor Whitman notes, “[e]vidently, Americans and continental
Europeans perceive privacy differently.” Id. at 1159.
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objectives are quite similar in Germany as in the United
States, but the precise means used to advance and achieve
these goals is somewhat different.67 Any serious effort to create
a general model, or template, for recognizing and protecting
privacy interests would need to take careful account of the
variation that exists in labeling these interests.68
Moreover, these differences in nomenclature are not
merely semantic; the labels used to describe protected autonomy
interests reflect deep socio-jurisprudential commitments, not
mere accidents of legal drafting.69 For example, Germany uses
“dignity” in lieu of “privacy” precisely because the phrase implies
a strong commitment to both individual and collective autonomy
interests.70 In Germany, both individuals and groups have a
constitutionally protected interest in human dignity.71 In
contrast, privacy, by its very nature, reflects and incorporates a
less communitarian ideal and reflects a legal order that
conveys legal protection to individuals, not groups.72
There is a significant potential upside to systematic
consideration of these differences between and among legal
systems. A comparative law approach to analyzing and
restating privacy would yield important insights about how
best to resolve difficult questions of public policy involving
conflicting claims by the government and individuals about the
proper scope of individual autonomy.73 I suspect that some
questions will have easy and obvious answers—for example,
most democratic societies do not tolerate the use of hard drugs,
Id. at 1219-21.
Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 916-18.
69 See Whitman, supra note 11, at 1171-1211 (discussing the normative and
jurisprudential values that inform “privacy” protections in France and Germany and
also noting the broader social and cultural values that helped to sustain and inform
these legal constructs).
70 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 907.
71 Id. at 906-16; Whitman, supra note 11, at 1160-64.
72 See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 906-16.
73 It bears noting that the ALI has used an empirical, comparative law
methodology to help inform its law reform efforts before—and in the area of privacy to
boot. When proposing the repeal of state and federal anti-sodomy laws, the ALI noted
that many nations in Europe had already acted to decriminalize consensual sexual
behavior between adults. See Yao Apasu-Bgotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526-27
(1986). The authors of this important survey, cited in Justice White’s unfortunate
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, see 478 U.S. 186, 192, 194 (1986), observe that
the ALI “noted that such nations as France, Great Britain, Canada, Mexico, Italy,
Denmark, and Sweden had repealed their sodomy statutes.” Yao, supra at 526. In this
sense, then, I am simply suggesting that the ALI use this same empirical, comparative
law methodology when addressing the myriad new privacy questions that technological
capabilities, in both government and private hands, have created. See Greg Gordon,
Surveillance Databases Could Be Massive, OREGONIAN, July 5, 2013, at A1.
67
68
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such as heroin, even if an individual claims that heroin use is
essential to her happiness and self-actualization. By way of
contrast, the law governing search and seizure, data protection,
and access to abortion varies widely from place to place, and
from society to society.
One final point merits both mention and consideration.
Notwithstanding the protean nature of privacy, the concept
retains tremendous cultural, legal, and political salience.
Simply put, people have come to expect the law to protect
privacy interests. Outside the United States, global outrage
arose in response to the revelations unleashed by Edward
Snowden’s leaking of classified information; this leaked
information established that U.S. government intelligence
agencies routinely engage in broad-based spying efforts on
allies of the United States (such as Germany and France).74
This global response provides concrete evidence that privacy, at
least as non-disclosure with respect to government, has great
transnational appeal. One U.S. intelligence program, called
PRISM, seeks to collect, synthesize, and analyze virtually all
communications transmitted over the Internet.75 In many
important respects, the very existence of a program like PRISM
renders the concept of privacy, if not meaningless, then
certainly less meaningful than we previously thought it to be.76

74 See Michael Birnbaum, Allegations Imperil Cooperation with U.S. on Key
Fronts, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2013, at A1 (discussing outrage in Europe over the NSA’s
routine surveillance of government officials in Germany, France, the EU, and elsewhere
in Europe); Birnbaum & Nakashima, supra note 55 (noting that “[r]evelations of NSA
spying in Germany has caused major political uproar in the country this year, with
investigations and fallout lasting long after outrage over Snowden’s revelations had
settled in the United States” and also that “swift condemnation of the United States
came from across the political spectrum in Germany”).
75 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2012, at A1;
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Taps in to Internet Giants, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 6, 2012, at A1; see also Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture
Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST, June 15, 2013,
at A1. Of course, the United States is hardly alone in operating massive, secret data
collection operations. See Steven Erlanger, France, Too, Is Sweeping Up Data,
Newspaper Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2013, at A3.
76 An equally distressing point is the apparent failure of the federal judges
sitting on the FISA court to take seriously their obligation to protect constitutional values
(rather than serve as a virtual rubber stamp for government requests to gather vast
amounts of private data). See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2013, at A1, A15 (“In more than a dozen classified rulings, the
nation’s surveillance court has created a secret body of law giving the National Security
Agency the power to amass vast collections of data on Americans.”). The FISA court
evidently has issued rulings on “broad constitutional questions” in a completely ex parte
process, and with no public disclosure of its constitutional decisions. Id.
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I am not at all sure that an ALI Restatement of privacy
would restrain governments bent on violating our privacy and
spying on us in ways that make the world imagined in George
Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, seem like our present
lived reality. On the other hand, it does seem to be a
particularly opportune moment to reconsider the concept of
privacy in a sustained and thoughtful fashion. If those who
believe in the importance and salience of privacy rights do not
demand their effective protection under law—against both
government and private entities—it seems almost certain that
we will cease to enjoy them.
A good way to begin working toward a Restatement of
privacy would be for the ALI to constitute a transnational
working group, including legal scholars from multiple
jurisdictions, that could undertake an empirical project of
identifying and classifying privacy interests within specific
domestic legal systems. In other words, before we attempt to say
what privacy should or could be, it would make sense to first
understand what privacy is from a more global perspective.
Rather than making bald normative claims about
privacy, I would argue that a better approach would first seek
to understand the ways in which the law already succeeds and
fails in securing interests that fall within the ambit of privacy
(or its German first cousin, dignity). At least initially, we
should undertake an effort to understand privacy from the
bottom up, rather than the top down. Such an approach would
also help to facilitate forging a global legal consensus on how
best to address privacy interests.
CONCLUSION
In some important respects, pinpointing discrete
subjects related to privacy interests and addressing them
incident to larger and broader restatement projects might
constitute the best approach to restating the law of privacy.
Rather than attempt to address the definitional and operational
problems, one could simply seek to avoid them by locating
privacy rules deeply within other domestic law subjects. Under
this approach, the ALI should simply continue to do what it
already has been doing—addressing privacy interests incident
to Restatements of other, more general, areas of law.
Nevertheless, we should pursue a bigger, bolder, and more
unified approach to the question of privacy law. To the extent that
law reform projects seek to bring order to areas of law that seem
to lack focus, definition, and clarity, privacy law would appear to
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be an ideal candidate for restatement. The fact remains that
designing and implementing such a project would be difficult.77
A comparative and empirical approach would undoubtedly
shed light on the meaning and scope of privacy; both points of
tangent and points of divergence would emerge from such an
undertaking. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the United
States should simply fall into lockstep behind other nations with
respect to privacy law—whether the question at issue relates to
search and seizure law, data protection, or reproductive rights. I
do, however, think that careful consideration of how other
democratic societies have addressed common problems might
shed important, and non-obvious, light on how best to address
these issues, both in the United States and more globally.
At its best, of course, this is precisely what the ALI’s
restatement projects attempt to do: synthesize legal
understanding, not merely as part of a descriptive enterprise, but
instead as part of an effort to improve and advance the
underlying values that the law seeks to protect. A Restatement of
privacy would be particularly difficult to accomplish, but it would
also be particularly useful in advancing and improving the state
of legal knowledge in this important field of law.

77

See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.

